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I. Introduction

Taking for Any Purpose?
By Camarin Madigan*

The Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment includes the often ignored
Public Use Provision. This paper looks at
the Court’s broad interpretation of this
provision and its deference to redevelopment agencies. Currently, the Court uses
two tests - “purely private” and blight
removal - to determine if the government
action has violated the public use provision. In a recent California case, 99 Cents
Only Store v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency1,
the district judge applied both of these
tests and determined that the
Redevelopment Agency had overstepped
its authority. This paper discusses the
role the courts should play in redevelopment in light of the framers’ intent and
precedent in the area of substantive economic due process. This paper also
addresses the impact of 99 Cents on takings law and the need for a clear test to
determine what is a legitimate taking for
public use.

* Camarin Madigan receieved her J.D. from UC
Hastings in May of 2003. She would like to thank
Professor Brian Gray and Gideon Kanner for their
help in researching this article as well as the editorial staff of this journal for assisting in preparing
this article for publication.
1. 237 F. Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001); dismissed and remanded 60 Fed.Appx. 123, 2003 WL
932421 (9th Cir. 2003)(not selected for publication). The appellate court affirmed the district
court’s conclusion that the controversy was not
moot at the time the district court granted the
injunction. This procedural setting does not affect
the substantive law discussed herein.
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II. History of the Takings Clause:
How Far is Too Far?
Eminent domain is the power of the
sovereign to acquire private property for
public use.2 The sovereign’s power of
eminent domain existed at common law.3
This sovereign power to take property was
limited4 by the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution: “nor shall private property be taken for pubic use, without just compensation.”5 The Fifth
Amendment places two conditions on the
government’s power to take property: the
taking must be for a public use and the
landowner must receive just compensation. The United States Supreme Court
began to interpret these limitations nearly a century after the drafting of the Fifth
Amendment.6 The first view of eminent
domain was rather narrow: “a right
belonging to a sovereignty to take private
property for its own uses, and not for
those of another.”7
2. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
3. The inherent power of the sovereign to exercise eminent domain was “well known when the
Constitution was adopted.” Kohl v. U.S., 91 U.S.
367, 372 (1876). Term “eminent domain” is traced
back to legal writings of Grotius in 1685. See Jack J.
Kitchin, What Use Is a Public Use in Eminent Domain?, 4
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 316 n. 1 (1957) (citing Groff v. Birdin-Hand Turnpike Co., 18 A. 431 (Pa. 1889).
4. At common law, the power of eminent
domain could take any form that the government
desired. Thus, the broad scope of common law
eminent domain authority was limited. 1 JOHN J.
DELANEY ET AL., LAND USE PRACTICE AND FORMS:
HANDLING THE LAND USE CASE 21-2 (2d ed. 1999).
5. U.S. CONST. AMEND V.
6. Kohl, 91 U.S. at 371 (also extending the limitations of the takings clause to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment). In Chicago, Burlington
& Quincy Railroad v. City of Chicago, the Court specifically held that the Fourteenth Amendment prevented the states from taking property without just
compensation. 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
7. Id. at 373-74.
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A broader view is that “public use”
provides the public with some benefit.8
As the American economy developed in
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court
moved toward this more broad view of the
Public Use provision.9 The Court began to
reason that the Public Use provision was
satisfied as long as the taking contributed
to the economic growth of the community. In a landmark redevelopment case of
1954, the Court acknowledged the police
power of redevelopment agencies to take
private property.10 Thus, the police power
components of “public safety, health, and
morality,” fulfilled the requirements of the
Public Use provision.11 In this case, the
Court determined the taking of land for a
private developer contributed to economic growth, enhanced public health, safety,
morals and welfare, and was thus determined to be a legitimate taking under the
Fifth Amendment12 because an area was
determined to be “blight.”13
8. Stephen J. Jones, Trumping Eminent Domain
Law: An Argument for Strict Scrutiny Analysis Under the
Public Use Requirement of the Fifth Amendment, 50
SYRACUSE L. REV. 285, 292 (2000)
9. See e.g., Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); see also Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); see also Old Dominion
Land Co. v. U.S., 269 U.S. 55 (1925).
10. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 29.
13. Physical and economic conditions that
cause blight. Cal. Health & Safety Code § 33031
(West 2002). (Buildings in which it is unsafe or
unhealthy for persons to live or work. Factors that
prevent or substantially hinder the economically
viable use or capacity of buildings or lots.
Depreciated or stagnant property values or
impaired investments, including those properties
containing hazardous wastes. Abnormally high
business vacancies, abnormally low lease rates,
high turnover rates, abandoned buildings, or
excessive vacant lots within an area developed for
urban use and served by utilities.)
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The Supreme Court had extended
great deference to the legislative determination of public use as early as 1896.17 At
that time the Court held that “when the
legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will
be respected by the courts, unless the use
be palpably without reasonable foundation.”18 If a public use proposed by the
legislature is legitimate and lies within an
explicit constitutional power of Congress,
the use satisfies the Public Use provision.19 Therefore, an implied power to
condemn exists in situations where the
power of eminent domain is necessary or
appropriate to carry out other powers.
This deferential standard extends from
14. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
15. Id. at 241.
16. Id. at 244 (citing Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S.
135, 155 (1921)).
17. U.S. v. Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S.
668 (1896).
18. Id. at 680.
19. Id. at 683.
20. Id. at 680.
21. Id.
22. Peter J. Kulick, Comment, Rolling the Dice:

the Court’s belief that the legislature
would not abuse its power because the
just compensation requirement, which
entails full value of the property to be
paid, restricts any condemnation for public use.20 However, the Court clearly specified that if the legislature delegates the
power of eminent domain to a private
entity, the deference would not be as
strong.21
In practice, however, judicial review
has been so deferential that a finding of
pubic use seems inevitable.22
The
Supreme Court has held that public use is
coterminous with the scope of the sovereign’s police power and, therefore the
Court defers to a legislative determination
that is rationally related to a conceived public purpose.23 The limit of the Court’s deference is that if a showing of a public use
is demonstrably pretextual, no judicial
deference is required.24
The role of the courts in the area of
eminent domain cases is self-defined as
an “extremely narrow one.”25 Having the
courts play such a limited role may be
dangerous because it allows corporations
to collude with the government and condemn private property for any public use
that can be rationalized.26 Most economic development plans fall within public use
Determining Public Use in Order to Effectuate a “PublicPrivate Taking”- A Proposal to Redefine “Public Use,” 2000
L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 639, 655 (Author writes
how the broad definition of the public use requirement allows an expansive reach of public-private
takings. citing Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 634 (1981).
23. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241.
24. Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321
(1996).
25. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
26. Joseph J. Lazzarotti, Public Use or Public
Abuse, 68 UMKC L. REV. 49, 51 (1999).
181
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Thirty years later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the import of the Public Use
provision and stated “purely private takings
will not withstand the scrutiny of the public
use requirement.”14 However, in the same
case, the Court also stated that if the purpose of the taking was rationally related to
a conceivable public use, it would not violate the Takings Clause.15 In fact, a private
taking may rise to the level of a public affair
given its class or character.16 This shift to a
broader construction of the Public Use provision maintained the Supreme Court’s deferential treatment of public use determinations by the legislature.
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because there is a possible benefit to the
public through general welfare and the legislature has the express power to provide
for the general welfare.27 However, simply
concurring with the legislature’s determination that the rationally conceived use,
purpose or benefit is good for the public
eliminates the judicial check on legislative
decision making. An expansive definition
of the Public Use provision and great judicial deference have opened the door for
private transfers of condemned property
and may have eliminated the Fifth
Amendment as a viable safeguard of private property rights.28
A. The Supreme Court Acknowledged
the Power of Redevelopment
Agencies
Modern redevelopment law tests the
extent of legislative power, the expansive
definition of the Public Use provision, and
the deferential role of the courts. In
Berman v. Parker, the U.S. Supreme Court
was faced with a congressional determination that with respect to Washington
D.C.’s substandard housing and blighted
areas, redevelopment could not be
attained “by the ordinary operations of
private enterprise alone without public
participation.”29 In 1945, Congress enacted
the
District
of
Columbia
Redevelopment Act to eliminate injurious
27. US CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. See Jones, supra note 7 at 287.
29. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
30. These conditions include substandard
housing and blighted areas that are injurious to the
public health, safety, morals, and welfare. Id. at 28.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 29.
33. The Agency was also authorized to transfer the land to public agencies for public purposes,
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conditions30 through “all means necessary and appropriate for the purpose.”31
Congress created the D.C. Redevelopment
Land Agency and granted it eminent
domain powers to acquire private property in order to prevent, reduce, or eliminate
blighting factors.32
The first redevelopment project
attempted was a low-rent housing district.
The Agency acquired and assembled real
property and was authorized to either
lease or sell some of the property33 to a
redevelopment company or individual
who promised to carry out the redevelopment plan.34 One landowner, who owned
a department store in the districted area,
objected to such appropriation because
his property was not blighted slum housing. The land owner argued that “[t]o take
a man’s property for the purpose of ridding the area of slums is one thing; it is
quite another . . . to take a man’s property
merely to develop a better balanced, more
attractive community.”35 The Supreme
Court disagreed. The Court believed that
the standards stated in the Act were adequate not only for eliminating the
slums,36 but also the blight areas that
tend to produce slums.37
The main guardian of the public welfare is the legislature.38 This concept of

including streets, utilities, recreational facilities
and schools. Id at 30.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 31.
36. The district court limited the redevelopment plan to this narrow definition: only existing
slums. The Supreme Court extended the interpretation of the standards to include future slum
areas. Id. at 35.
37. Id.
38. See Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 155.
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public welfare is broad and inclusive.39
The legislature has the authority to determine the values and needs of community
to support the public welfare.40 Once the
authority of Congress is defined to cover
the public welfare, the right to exercise
eminent domain as a means to the end is
evident.41 To achieve this end, the authorized agencies may use eminent domain to
acquire property in all blighted parts of
the community instead of on a limited
“structure-by-structure basis.”42 The specific attack on the problem is left to the
discretion of the legislative branch once
the legislature determines the broad public purpose and the expanse of public welfare covered by the Agency.43

The Court’s broad interpretation of
the police power of the redevelopment
agency in Berman bestowed a certain
amount of authority on redevelopment
agencies and local governments across
the country. After Berman, two broad rules
existed: the Public Use provision could be
fulfilled by economic revitalization and the
courts would give great deference to the
legislative determination of public use.47
Since public welfare and removal of blight
legitimately fulfilled the “Public Use” provision, redevelopment agencies had the
authority to condemn property on little
more than a study and findings of blight.

In Berman, the Supreme Court clearly
defined the extent of this discretion by
stating that its role in determining a public use was extremely narrow.44 In fact,
once Congress has determined the variables necessary to maintain the public
welfare, the Court holds it is not in a position to “reappraise” these determinations.45 When a public purpose has been
identified, the means by which the legislature carries out its plan - the amount and
character of land to be taken - fall within
the legislature’s discretion.46

Thirty years later, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed a broad reading of the Public
Use provision.48 In Midkiff, the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on Berman to
reverse a Ninth Circuit opinion that the
Hawaii Land Reform Act of 196749 did not
pass the “requisite judicial scrutiny of the
Public Use Clause.”50 The Ninth Circuit
narrowly interpreted Berman to hold that
the government is required to “possess”
and use the property during the taking.51
However, such a literal reading of the takings clause was rejected by Rindge Co. v. Los
Angeles.52 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit

39. See Day-Brite Lightning, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421, 424 (1952).
40. The Court held that “when the legislature has
spoken the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
41. See Gettysburg Electric Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at
679; see also Luxton v. N. River Bridge Co., 153 U.S.
525, 529-30 (1894).
42. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34.
43. See Shoemaker v. U.S., 147 U.S. 282, 298 (1893).
44. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
45. Id. at 33.

B. Taking the “Use” out of the
“Public Use” Provision

46. Id. at 35-36 (citing Shoemaker, 147 U.S. at
298).
47. Id. at 32, 34.
48. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229.
49. Land Reform Act of 1967, Haw. Rev. Stat.
§§ 516-1(2), (11), 516-22 (1977).
50. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 235.
51. 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983).
52. 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923) (“[I]t is not essential
that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public use.”).
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held that a more rigorous judicial scrutiny
of the state’s legislative determinations
was necessary.53 The Supreme Court disagreed and stated that requiring this
stricter standard would be ironic because
the Public Use provision is incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment,
whereas the legislature is mandated by
the Fifth Amendment.54
Instead, the Supreme Court read
Berman to require both a legitimate legislative police power and judicial deference: “when the legislature has spoken,
the public interest has been declared in
terms well-nigh conclusive.”55 In Midkiff,
the Hawaiian legislature claimed public
welfare alone, with no finding of blight, as
its authority to condemn the property
specified in the Land Reform Act.56 The
Hawaiian legislature passed the Act to
condemn privately owned residential
tracts and then to transfer the condemned
property to existing lessees to redress
problems caused by concentrated land
ownership.57 The purpose was to redistribute the land to guard against inflating
land prices and to protect public tranquility and welfare.58
53. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243.
54. Id. at 244, n. 7.
55. Id. at 239.
56. Id. at 236-37.
57. In fact, no oligopoly existed. The condemned
land was part of a moral trust formed by the last
Hawaiian royalty. Income from the trust supported
Kamahamaha schools. The long-term leaseholds were
functioning for the public good. Politician John Connor
pushed the Act through the Hawaiian legislature for his
own benefit. The results were devastating to the lessees.
When the land became freehold, Japanese businessmen,
who do not tend to deal with leaseholds, bought all the
houses, reducing the already limited supply. The Kahala
refugees entered a seller’s market that was marked by
inflated prices. Although the Court held that there was
adequate police power to support a public use, the reality is that the public was heavily burdened by the ruling.
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To determine whether Hawaii condemned the property for a “public use” the
Court examined the scope of the state’s
police power and concluded that the legislature is “the main guardian of the public needs.”59 The Court held that the
Public Use requirement is “coterminous60
with the scope of the sovereign’s police
power.”61 Then, the Court deferred to the
legislature’s police power. Such deference
is required “until it is shown to involve an
impossibility.”62 Once the legislature has
determined that the project has a legitimate public purpose, the legislature has
the ability to choose the means with
which to accomplish the project.63
Judicial restraint requires the Courts to be
deferential to the legislatures in determining governmental function.64 While
the scope of judicial scrutiny is narrow,
“there is, of course, a role for the courts to
play in reviewing a legislature’s judgment
of what constitutes a public use.”65 No
judicial deference is required, for
instance, where the ostensible public use
is demonstrably pretextual.66
In Midkiff, the Court held that the use
58. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 234.
59. Id. at 239.
60.
This determination is problematic
because the police power usually divides noncompensable regulation and a compensable taking of property. See Jones supra note 8 at 296.
61. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
62. Id. at 240 (citing Old Dominion, 269 U.S.at 66).
63. Id.
64. Berman, 348 U.S. at 36; see also TVA v.
Welch, 327, U.S. 546, 552 (1946); see also Gettysburg
Electric, 160 U.S. at 680.
65. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
66. See Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321 (holding
that a forced sale of private property for purpose of
allowing private developer to acquire it at a
reduced price would not be for “public use”).
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The purpose of the taking, not the
process, must meet the requirements of
the Public Use provision.71 The Court
held that the purpose of the Act, eliminating oligopolies, was a legitimate public
purpose, fell within the legislature’s
police power, and benefited the general
welfare.72 Only a “purely private” taking
would not satisfy the requirements of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.73
C. “Purely Private” and Removing
Blight, the Two Tests of the
Public Use Provision
Today, the Takings Clause is still
interpreted broadly. To meet the Public
Use provision, a legislature need only
67. Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; see also Rindge Co.
v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923).
68. Regulating an oligopoly and the evils
associated with it is a classic example of a State’s
police powers. Id. at 242 (citing Exxon Corp. v.
Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)).
69. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242 (quotingWestern &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648, 671-72 (1981)).
70. Id. at 242.
71. Id. at 240.
72. Id. at 245.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 240.

show that the purpose behind the project
falls under its legitimate police power.74
A connection to public health, safety,
morals, or welfare allows a legislature to
condemn private property in order to carry
out a plan.75 The most liberal test is the
“not purely private” justification of
Midkiff.76 Any rational suggestion of general welfare will do.77
Most redevelopment programs rely
on blight to establish the public welfare,
public use requirement. By citing blight,
redevelopers lock in on the local government’s unquestioned authority to safeguard “health and safety.”78 In California,
redevelopers rely on this rationale. The
goal
of
California
Community
Redevelopment Law is to give a redevelopment agency the power to remove
existing blight.”79 Avoiding “future blight”
is speculative and, therefore, the courts
have held that it is not a means to satisfy
the “Public Use” provision.80 Because a
legislature or redevelopment agency must
determine existing blight, an area’s existing use, not a potential one, is the basis
for public use.”81
However, this extreme reliance on
existing blight is not reflected in the
75. Berman, 348 U.S. at 28.
76. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
77. Id. at 242.
78. George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That’s Right
for California Redevelopment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991,
992 (2001).
79. Beach-Courchesne v. City of Diamond Bar,
95 Cal Rptr. 2d 265, 279 (Cal. Ct. App., 2000); see also
Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes
Redev. Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 362 (Cal. Ct.
App., 2000).
80. Id.
81. Mammoth, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362.
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of eminent domain is rationally related67
to the public purpose of reducing the
land oligopoly that inhibits the economic market for land.68 Because regulating
oligopolies is a comprehensive and
rational approach to maintaining general
welfare, the Court held that the legislature could have rationally believed that
the Act promoted its objectives. 69
Whether the Act was successful in
achieving these goals is irrelevant, the
legislature merely had to rationally
believe the Act will meet these goals.70
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United States Supreme Court precedent.82
In Berman¸ the Court upheld a redevelopment plan that invoked eminent domain
power for the “prevention, reduction, or
elimination of blighting factors or causes
of blight.”83 While the District Court narrowly construed the meaning of “slum”
within the Act as “existence of conditions
‘injurious to the public health, safety,
morals, and welfare,’”84 the Supreme
Court allowed a broader reading of the
Act. The Supreme Court extended the
Redevelopment Agency’s authority to
include “the blighted areas that tend to
produce slums.”85 Prevention of “future
blight” seems to fall within the Supreme
Court’s definition of the Agency’s power of
eminent domain.
Still, in California, the legislature has
narrowed the extent that economic revitalization can be considered a public use
and requires that blight be explicitly
linked to economic dislocation.86 The
California Supreme Court had already set
this high standard in 1976 when it held
that only proof of no economically viable
use could support a finding of economic
dislocation.87 The city could not treat the
site as a liability because of its unrealized
potential.88 In California, “future blight” is
not a justified means of satisfying the
“Public Use” provision.

82. Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
83. Id.
84. 117 F. Supp. 705, 724-25 (D.C. D.C. 1953).
85. Berman, 348 U.S. at 35.
86. Findings of blight are to be supported by at
least one physical as well as one economic blighting condition listed in the statute. Cal. Health &
Safety Code § 33031(a)(1963)(amended 1993).
87. Sweetwater Valley Civic Assn v. City of National
City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Cal. 1976). The court ruled
against a redevelopment project that would have replaced
186
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D. 99 Cents Only: A Judicial Check on
the Redevelopment’s Power of
Eminent Domain
On this legal background, the District
Court of the Central District Court of
California approached the public use
question in 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency.89 The district court
found that the city and the
Redevelopment Agency had violated the
“public use” provision of the takings
clause, when the Agency initiated condemnation proceedings against 99 Cents
with the intent to transfer the property
directly to Costco.90 The court granted 99
Cents’ motion for summary judgment and
issued an injunction.91 In 2003, the appellate court reviewed the mootness issue
and determined that there was a live controversy at the time the district court
granted this injunction.92
1. Factual Background
In 1983, the city of Lancaster began a
revitalization plan of the area now in
question. Under California’s Community
Redevelopment Law, the city had to
establish the parameters of the redevelopment area and a redevelopment plan.
The city established the Amargosa
Redevelopment Project Area93 and adopted the Amargosa Plan, which contained

a golf course that was susceptible to flooding with a high
revenue-producing shopping mall. Although the golf
course was marginally profitable, the site would have been
more profitable with an intense commercial use.
88. Id. at 1103-04.
89. 237 F. Supp.2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
90. Id. at 1130.
91. Id.
92. 2003 WL 932421 *1.
93. The Amargosa Area consists of approximately 4,600 acres.
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To fund other planning projects, in
1994, the Agency amended the Plan to
allow it to continue using property tax
increment funds.96 At that time, the
Agency did not extend its eminent
domain powers, and these powers expired
in 1995, under the original Plan. A second
amendment to the Plan in March of 1997
94. The Plan which was adopted by ordinance
contained findings that:
“(i) inclusion within the Project Area of any lands,
buildings or improvements which are not detrimental to
the public health, safety or welfare is necessary for the
effective redevelopment of the area of which they are a
part; any such area included is necessary for effective
redevelopment of the Project Area and is not included for
the purpose of obtaining the allocation of tax increment
revenues from such area pursuant to Section 3367- of the
Community Redevelopment Law without substantial
justification for its inclusion.”
“(j) the elimination of blight and redevelopment of
the Project Area cannot reasonably expected to be
accomplished by private enterprise acting alone and
without the aid and assistance of the agency.”
95. See 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1123.

re-granted the power of eminent domain
to the Agency. This revised Plan97 cited
no new findings of blight and instead
relied upon the 1983 findings.
In 1998, 99 Cents Only Store, “99
Cents,” moved into the Power Center in a
vacancy next to Costco. At the time, 99
Cents signed a five-year lease with an
option to extend the lease for another fifteen years. 99 Cents was a successful
addition to the shopping center, which
had become quite prestigious. Soon after
99 Cents opened in Lancaster, Costco felt
a need to expand, specifically onto the
site occupied by 99 Cents. The property
owner, Burnham Pacific, explained that
“the most efficient use of [Costco’s] property would be an expansion to the south
of their existing facility behind the 99
Cents Only Store.”98 Although this solution seemed like an adequate compromise, the city and the Agency considered
Costco’s demands because they feared
Costco would leave and the city would
lose the tax revenue.99 Through negotiations, the Agency, Costco and Burnham
Pacific drafted a Disposition and
Development Agreement through which
96. The Plan was amended to comply with AB 1290.
97. The amendments did not add new area to the Plan.
98. See 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1124..
99. The fear of Costco’s departure was very real. In
the mid-1980’s, the cities of Lancaster and Palmdale, the
only incorporated cities in the Antelope Valley, competed for many stores and shopping center developments.
A number of major tenants have moved from Lancaster
to Palmdale, leaving behind large vacant buildings and
suffering shopping centers. In 1990, both Sears and J.C.
Penney moved to Palmdale with Palmdale’s assistance.
In 1998, Mervyns relocated to Palmdale. (The empty
story was offered to 99 Cents as an option for a relocation
site.) Between 1986 and 1994, four major car dealerships
relocated to Palmdale from Lancaster. They city was very
concerned that Costco might also relocated to Palmdale
and leave behind a huge vacant building and the Power
Center on the road to deterioration.
187
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findings that the Amargosa Area was
blighted.94 The city’s specific findings listed “inadequate public improvement and
facilities, faulty subdivision planning, and
flood hazards” as the blight that plagued
the Amargosa Area.95 To redevelop this
area, the Plan gave the city the power of
eminent domain for twelve years, until
1995, in order to condemn blighted property. As part of the revitalization process,
Lancaster started a regional shopping
center development, called the Valley
Center shopping center. The plan was to
have businesses in the “Power Center”
anchor the development. In 1988, Costco
Wholesale Corporation agreed to be one
such “anchor” business and participated
in the development of the shopping center until its completion in 1991 and the
completion of infrastructure in 1993.
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the Agency would purchase the property
and have 99 Cents re-locate. This decision, made without 99 Cents’ input, ended
with an agreement that the Agency would
acquire the property through eminent
domain for $3.8 million and then sell the
property to Costco for one dollar ($1).100
2. Procedural History
In May 2000, the Agency commenced
the condemnation process of Burnham
Pacific’s property and offered to buy out
99 Cents’ leasehold interest for $130,000
and to pay relocation costs pursuant to
the terms of the Development Agreement,
which required the Agency to use its best
efforts to acquire the property. 99 Cents
rejected this offer. The city held a public
hearing at which the Agency proposed
certain Resolutions (21-00 and 22-00) that
allowed the Agency to acquire the property through eminent domain. In these
Resolutions, the Agency made no findings
of blight concerning the Power Center and
99 Cents.101 The Resolutions were passed
June 27, 2000, and 99 Cents commenced
this lawsuit.
The Agency rescinded these
Resolutions six months later and terminated the Development Agreement.102
The Agency argued to the district court
that these rescissions rendered 99 Cents’
complaint moot. However, the Agency
would not agree to avoid using its emi-

100. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1124.
101. Id.
102. After adoption of the Resolutions, the Agency
learned that Home Base would not consent to construction of a Costco gas station in Costco’s existing parking
lot. The Agency was required to rescind the DDA because
the DDA specifically required its termination, if the property could not be acquired for any reason.
103. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1130.
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nent domain power to acquire 99 Cents’
property interest if the Court were to dismiss the lawsuit. 99 Cents believes the
Agency may later use its power unless the
court rules. Prior to the hearing, in March
2001, the Agency had found another site
not in the Power Center, which it was in
the process of transferring to Costco.
3. Analysis of the District
Court’s Decision
The district court found that the
Agency’s attempt to use eminent domain
power to obtain 99 Cents’ property for
Costco violated the public use provision
of the Constitution.103 The Agency’s
actions failed both the test of blight
removal from Berman and Midkiff’s “purely
private use” test.104
In applying the Midkiff standard that
only the purpose of the taking must satisfy the “Public Use” provision,105 the court
found that the only reason the Agency
“took” the property was “to satisfy the private expansion demands of Costco.”106
Such a purely private taking cannot “withstand the scrutiny of the public use
requirement” and does not serve a legitimate governmental purpose.107 For a taking to meet this Public Use provision, it
need only be “rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”108 This standard is extremely low because the court
applies merely the rational basis test to
104. The court also made decisions based upon
mootness and timeliness. The city and Redevelopment
Agency also argue that this case should be heard in state
court. This paper does not discuss any of these issues.
105. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 242.
106. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1128.
107. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
108. Id. at 241.
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Here, the Agency’s use of eminent
domain was an attempt to transfer private
property from one private entity to another. The court held that appeasement of
Costco was not sufficiently related to a
public purpose to satisfy the Public Use
provision.112 Ironically, appeasement of
Costco seems to have been successfully
achieved without condemnation of 99
Cents’ property because Costco has
remained in Lancaster.113
Still, the Agency argued that satisfying Costco fulfilled the Public Use provision under Berman’s blight test. As an
“anchor” business, Costco was necessary
to keep the Power Center from returning
to blight. Under this future blight argument, there is no indication that 99 Cents
had elements of existing blight or was
contributing to the blight of the area. The

109. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1128.
110. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
111. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321.
112. Id..
113. Unfortunately, the newly proposed site
for Costco requires building on approximately 5
acres of Lancaster’s City Park and the cutting down
of more than 100 trees.
114. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1128, n. 2.
115. Absence of “future blight” as an allowable public use determination in CRL is practical. If redevelopment agencies were allowed to use their eminent

Agency relied on the evidentiary findings
of blight in the original 1983 Amargosa
Plan to show that the Power Center would
exhibit blighted conditions if Costco left.
The court held that failure to show existing blight means that the Agency lacked a
valid public use within the meaning of the
Takings Clause.114 Future blight is not
designated as a way to meet the Public
Use provision of the California
Community Redevelopment Law.115
However, as explained above, a broad
reading of Berman may indicate future
blight as an appropriate determination of
public use.116 Still, Lancaster did not discuss the possibility of future blight before
this litigation. Because a discussion of
future blight is not found in the
Resolutions or in the Development
Agreement with Costco, this public purpose seems pretextual. The district court
found that, even if future blight were a
means of establishing public use, the
record did not reflect the claim of future
blight.117 The court held that the Agency’s
attempt to wield its eminent domain
power to prevent some unidentifiable
“future blight” that may never materialize
violated the Public Use provision of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.118

domain powers to remove future blight, there would be
no check on their indiscriminate power. No redevelopment site would ever truly be free from blight because
future would always loom ever-present on the horizon.
See 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1129.
116. In Berman, the United States Supreme Court
upheld as constitutional D.C.’s Redevelopment Act,
which granted eminent domain power to acquire real
property for the “redevelopment of blighted territory . . .
and the prevention, reduction, or elimination of blighting
factors or causes of blight.” Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
117. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1129.
118. Id. at 1130.
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the proffered public use, which needs not
to be proven, only be conceivable.
However, even under this deferential standard, mere existence of legislative action
does not establish public use as a matter
of law.109 Courts do play a role in reviewing a legislature’s determination of the
public use.110 If the public use is demonstrably pretextual, there is no requirement
for judicial deference.111
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III. The Meaning of the “Public Use”
Provision Is the Future of the
Takings Clause
In the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, the inherent sovereign
power of eminent domain is limited by
the requirement of payment of just compensation and public use. The just compensation requirement naturally limits
the government’s power and protects private property because the government
can only afford to pay for a certain amount
of property that it acquires through eminent domain. The Public Use provision
requires that the legislature make determinative findings as to public use.
Courts review legislative findings
with substantial deference.119 Under the
Takings Clause, the court defers to the legislative determination of “public use”
unless “it is shown to involve an impossibility.”120 Such judicial restraint allows
state and local governments to make
broad decisions affecting their jurisdictions without having these decisions second-guessed by a judge who is unaware of
the particular issues affecting the specific
communities. The legislature has the role
of protecting the public good and, thus,
should make these decisions.121 Eminent
domain is one of the tools available to the
legislature to protect the public good.
The court is a buffer, or as James Madison
referred to it, a “defensive authority,”
119. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665
(1994) (citing Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic
National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 126 (1973)).
120. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240; see also Old
Dominion, 269 U.S. at 66.
121. Id at 239; see also Berman, 348 U.S. at 32;
see also Hirsh, 256 U.S. at 155.
122. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
123. Armendariz, 75 F.3d at 1321.
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between the rights of the people and the
legislature.122 The duty of the courts is to
hold the legislature within its enumerated
authority. Once a legislature has determined that the public good is compromised, the court presumes that the plan,
created to restore the public welfare, is
rationally related to a public use. If the
legislature exceeds its authority and falsely determines public use, no such judicial
deference is required.123
The purpose of the Fifth Amendment
is to protect the property interest of private individuals. The framers of the
Constitution believed popular government could pose a threat to property
rights, but they also believed that a strong
national government could protect property rights. Alexander Hamilton declared:
“One great obj[ective] Of Gov[ernment] is
personal protection and the security of
Property.”124 For many of the framers,
property was intrinsically related to liberty: “Property must be secured or liberty
cannot exist.”125 While the Constitution
does not proclaim the natural right of
property ownership, Virginia and North
Carolina did request an amendment
which declared that acquisition, possession and protection of property to be listed as an inalienable right.126 James
Madison drafted the Fifth Amendment
takings clause as an additional safeguard
to due process protection of property.127
124. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1782, vol.1,
302 (Max Farrand, ed.)(Yale Univ. Press rev. ed. 1937).
125. “Discourse on Davila,” THE WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, (1851) at vol. 6, 280 (Charles Francis
Adams, ed.)(Little, Brown, 1851).
126. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND
WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 182-84, 198-200 (Norman ed.,
Univ. of Okla. Press 1957).
127. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT 55 (Oxford Press 1992).
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No man shall be deprived of his
liberty or property, but by the
judgment of his peers, or the law
of the land, and should the public
exigencies make it necessary, for
the common preservation, to take
any person’s property, or to
demand his particular services,
full compensation shall be made
for the same.129
The Fifth Amendment also transfers
the burden of public works from the individual to the public by requiring just compensation.
After the states ratified the Bill of
Rights, Madison wrote an essay suggesting a broad interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment.130 He declared that a government “which indirectly violates their
property, in their actual possessions . . . is
not a pattern for the US.”131 It seems
Madison sought a generous understanding of the takings clause to include more
than just physical takings of property. The
Supreme Court followed this interpretation when defining modern property
rights, after Justice Holmes held that a
128. Id.
129.
The Northwest Ordinance, Documents
Illustrative of the Formation of the American States, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. at 47-54, reprinted in WILLIAM F.
SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION (1982).
130. THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON vol. 14., 26668 (Robert A. Rutlands & Thomas A. Mason
eds.)(Univ. Press of Vir. 1983).

regulation that goes too far is a taking.132
Takings today represent the balance
between government action to protect the
public good and the property rights of a
private individual. When the government,
whether it is federal, state, local or a redevelopment agency, acquires private property
through eminent domain, the landowner is
fairly compensated. The individual is not
forced to bear the burden of the public good,
which seems to be the rationale behind
Madison’s Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.
On the other hand, the government is limited in its ability to wield its eminent domain
power by the requirement of compensation
at fair market value. Therefore, this power is
used sparingly. This balance and the limit
on the abuse of the power come from the
just compensation requirement.
The meaning and purpose of the just
compensation requirement is clear, but the
importance of the Public Use provision is
still questioned. In the Constitution, the
words “public use” are not defined and the
structure does not imply that a taking must
be for a “public use.”133 “The phrase does
not read ‘shall not be taken except for public use and not without just compensation.’”134 Court decisions tend to rely on the
just compensation requirement as the
major limitation to the Takings Clause.
Such readings of the Fifth Amendment
seem to imply that “there is no per se public use requirement.”135
131. THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, vol 14, 20407 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutlands, eds.)
(Univ. Press of Vir., 1979).
132. Pennsylvania Coal, Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
133. William Stoebuck, A General Theory of
Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 591 (1972).
134. Id.
135. See Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining
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In drafting the Fifth Amendment, Madison
relied on language from the Northwest
Ordinance and the Massachusetts and
Vermont state constitutions to convey the
financial burden of public works from the
individual to the public.128 The Northwest
Ordinance states that
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A. The Public Use Provision is
Necessary to Specify the Extent of
the Government’s Power of
Eminent Domain
Although the “public use” provision
has become toothless in the text of the
modern doctrine, the language “for public
use” has an important place in the text of
the Takings Clause. For strict textualists,
these three words, located between
“taken” and “without just compensation,”
mean that when the government takes privately owned property it must be put to a
public use.136 This construction of “for
public use” no longer duplicates the
“legitimate state-interest” test that is
required by the Due Process Equal
Protection Clauses. If Madison intended
the Takings Clause to be an “additional
safeguard” on the due process protection
of property,137 then the Public Use provision must be a higher standard than the
due process test. The Public Use provision’s purpose is to relieve the individual
landowner of the cost of projects that condemn property for state use to benefit the
public and should therefore be borne by
the community as a whole.
Such a strict reading of the Takings
Clause would reduce redistribution of property138 and calls into question redevelopment law. Specifically, reading a heightened standard into the Takings Clause
through the Public Use provision would
nullify Midkiff. If the phrase “for public use”
merely reflects the requirement of a rationPublic Use in Order to Effectuate a “Public-Private
Taking”- a Proposal to Redefine “Public Use,” 2000 L. REV.
MICH. U. DET. C.L. 639, 644 (2000).
136. Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077,
1079 (1993).
137. See Ely supra note 126.
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al relationship between the state interest
and the taking, then no state use is required
and the three words are meaningless. Basic
statutory construction emphasizes a literal
meaning of the text. Why would Madison
have included the public use provision, if
the Takings Clause requires only basic due
process guarantees?
There are two limitations on the government’s sovereign power of eminent
domain: just compensation and public
use. The government must meet both of
these requirements in order to lawfully
condemn property. Reading the Takings
Clause as to only require payment of fair
market value and a rational legitimate
governmental interest renders the Public
Use provision useless. Without this provision, the possibilities of abuse increase.
The lower standard of a legitimate governmental interest currently allows for redevelopment agencies to take property from
one private party and give it directly to
another private party if the transfer seems
to be in the public interest or for the public good.139
Meddling in the free market is bound
to cause problems and incite corruptive
uses of the eminent domain power.
Competitive markets promote economic
efficiency.140 However, the continual
temptation for governments to intervene
upsets the balance, efficiency, and success of these markets.141 One example of
a government regulation which seems to
benefit the public welfare, but, in fact,
138. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
139. See id. at 235.
140.
EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY/ APPLICATION 277 (1997).
141. Id.
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Similarly, when governments use
eminent domain to favor one private
interest over another, economic efficiency
is lost. The Public Use provision guards
against governmental encroachment into
the private sector. Therefore, the Public
Use provision should be treated as a separate and distinct requirement in the
Takings Clause. While a certain amount of
redevelopment is acceptable, when it
goes to far, to the point of the government
meddling in the interests of private parties, a taking has occurred. The district
court in 99 Cents Only was correct in recognizing a condemnation that lacked the
requisite findings under the Public Use
provision.145 Although the Supreme
Court has held that removal of blight sufficiently fulfills the Public Use provision,
“future blight” is not equivalent to public
use. When the government hypothesizes
about the impact one existing private
entity may have on a community, the use

142. Whereas 60 percent of American families
own their own homes, only 30 percent of New
Yorkers are owners. Id. at 283.
143. Id.
144. There are about 1.8 million apartments
in New York. The average rent in $7,000 per year,
whereas the equilibrium rent would be about
$8,000. Landlord loss is $1.8 million * ($8,000 $7,000) = $1,800 million. Gain in consumer surplus
is $1,800 million – (1/2 * (2.0 million – 1.8 million) *
($9,000-$8,000)) = $1,700 million. Loss in producer

of eminent domain to insure the private
entity’s success goes too far and is an
unconstitutional taking.
However, Madison did intend a broad
reading of the “public interest” provision
of the Takings Clause.146 In fact, the
Berman Court states that eminent domain
can be granted to redevelopment agencies to eliminate or prevent blighting factors or causes of blight.147 Perhaps a
broader, non-literal interpretation of the
“public use” provision is correct.
B. Judicial Restraint Bars Courts
from Involving Themselves in the
Politics of Takings
Courts are directed to defer to the legislative judgment because the legislature is
the body of government charged with protecting the public welfare.148 The legislature has the resources to make evidentiary
findings and to pass laws with the goal of
providing for the people. A court that is
removed from the public arena may not be
aware of the needs of a specified community. In the past, when a judicially active
Court involved itself in social controversy,
the Court opened the door to years of criticism and non-sensical decisions.149 In
Lochner v. New York, the United States
Supreme Court overturned a New York law
that limited the hours of labor for bakery
workers because the majority felt that the

surplus is $1,800 million + (1/2 * (2.0 million –1.8
million) * ($8,000 - $7,000) = $1,900 million. Loss
in produce surplus ($1,900 million) – gain in consumer surplus ($1,700) = $200 million. See id.
145. 99 Cents Only, 237 F. Supp.2d at 1130.
146. Id. at 1129.
147. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 29.
148. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239.
149. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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severely burdens the public, is rent control. Specifically, in New York, a city of
renters,142 the City Rent Guidelines Board
sets rates well below the market levels
and also sets limits on vacancy
allowances.143 With this system, landlords lose $200 million more than renters
gain.144 This deadweight loss of $200 million per year is a loss in efficiency and
negatively affects the public as a whole.
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The courts have previously refused to
get involved when the legislature has

passed laws, which would benefit one private entity over another. In the early
1870’s, the dairy industry began lobbying
state legislatures for protection through
anti-margarine laws. The first result was
state labeling statutes in 1877.153
Because these statutes were not 100-percent effective at protecting the butter
industry, the lobbying continued. Relying
on weak public interest claims - margarine
was alleged to be unhealthy, to cause dyspepsia and a number of other aliments the dairy industry won over many legislatures. Even a House of Representatives
committee, which studied margarine,
determined that the imitation product was
detrimental to public health.154 The
Supreme Court upheld anti-margarine
statutes, which regulated or prohibited the
sale or use of margarine, because the state
had the power to protect public health.155
Essentially, the government was legally
boosting the dairy industry by regulating
margarine production. In 1886, to increase
Congressional support, the dairy industry
organized a massive letter-writing campaign, which was impressive even by today’s
standards.156 Both Houses of Congress
passed the federal anti-margarine bill; and
under further political pressure, President
Cleveland signed the Margarine Tax Act into
law.157 The survival of democracy rests on
the fact that people elect legislators to represent their interests. If the courts are continually bypassing the voice of the people,
then the result will be a judicial monarchy.

150. Id. at 47- 48.
151. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); see also
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); see also
Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
152. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937); see also U.S. v. Carolene Products,
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
153. New York: Act of June 5, 1877, ch. 415, 1877 N.Y.

Laws 441; Missouri: Act of April 28, 1877, 1877 Mo. Laws 319.
154. H.R. REP. NO. 2028, at 2 (1886).
155. Powell v. Penn., 127 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1888).
156. Number of petitions from the biggest dairy states: New
York (21,923), Pennsylvania (15,487), Iowa (11,601), Ohio (10,081),
Minnesota (8,282), Illinois (7,533), and Wisconsin (6,482). 17
CONG. REC. H. 4930 88-89 (1886) (remarks of Rep. Price).
157. H.R. EXEC. DOC. NO.. 396, at 1-2 (1886).

law did not serve an adequate purpose.150
For three decades, the Court maintained its
role of actively determining the limit of the
state’s police power.151 By the mid-1930’s,
legal realists recognized the Lochner opinion
as a decision, which merely overturned the
political process. There is no reason for the
Court to participate in political choices.152
Therefore, the court should leave the
issues of development to the politics of the
legislature. The legislators, elected individuals, are publicly accountable to their constituents. The lobbying and public hearings
are designed to provide the lawmakers with
information about the needs and desires of
the public. The court lacks this information.
When the Redevelopment Agency of
Lancaster agreed to condemn the property
where 99 Cents was located, and pay their
relocation costs, this decision reflected what
the city council and the Redevelopment
Agency thought was best for the public
good. It is also evident that 99 Cents did not
sufficiently persuade the local government
of the benefit it could provide the city. And
the public had an opportunity to voice their
worries at the public hearings. Judicial
restraint reasons that because the court was
not present at these hearings it should stay
away from this level of local politics.
1. Court Supports Dairy Industry Over
Oleo-Margarine Producers
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A more recent example of the government successfully defending one private
interest over another is Williamson v. Lee
Optical of Oklahoma. The Oklahoma state
law at issue specifically stated that only a
licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist
or someone with prescriptive authority
from an optometrist or ophthalmologist
may fit lens to the face or replace the
lens.158 Petitioners claimed the statute
was unconstitutional because it violated
the Due Process Clause “by arbitrarily
interfering with the optician’s right to do
business.”159 Even though the trial court
agreed with the petitioner, the US
Supreme Court determined that it was the
legislature’s role, not that of the courts “to
balance the advantages and disadvantages” of the new law.160 The Court relied
upon Judge Waite’s wise statement: “For
protection against abuses by legislators
the people must resort to the polls, not to
the courts.”161 As long as the law is
“rationally related to the public health
and welfare,” the legislature may regulate
private enterprise.162 The legislature has
an interest in attempting to free eye-professionals “from all taints of commercialism.”163 Even though the legislature
chose to only regulate some of the people
158. 59 Okl. Stat. Ann §§ 941-47 Okl. Laws
1953, c.13, §§ 1-8.
159. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348
U.S. 483, 483 (1955)
160. Id. at 487
161. Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876).
162. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. at 487.
163. Semler v. Or. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs,
294 U.S. 608, 611 (1935).
164. Id. (Reform may take place one step at a
time, where the legislature attempts to address
the most acute part of the problem)

who work with human eyes, the law proscribing solicitations and advertisements
was constitutional because the legislature
may choose the evils it can effectively
combat.164
C. The Impact 99 Cents Only Will Have
on Takings Law
This case is still in its infancy and,
therefore, any forecasts as to the ultimate
impact on the Takings Clause and
Redevelopment Law are purely speculative.
Cities and redevelopment agencies
bemoaned the district court’s opinion,
declaring that the decision will severely
hamper the ability of the city’s redevelopment agency to undertake future projects.165 Furthermore, involvement of the
courts in municipal decisions undermines
the role of the legislative bodies to determine how individual projects are carried
out within the bounds of legitimate community redevelopment.166 Redevelopment agencies are predicting an alarming
trend in decisions limiting the government’s taking and redevelopment power.167
On the other hand, this decision may
mark the end of the abuses of redevelopment. Newspapers reporting on this issue
stated that property owners can now
breathe a collective sigh of relief.168 This
is especially true for a Rancho Mirage
165. Karen Maeshiro, 99 Cents Ruling Faces City
Appeal Redevelopment Hurt, Officials Say, Los Angeles
Daily News, at AV 1 (July 18, 2001).
166. Id.
167. Steven Greenhut, Commentary, An Illegal
Taking is Taken Back, The Orange County Register,
(July 8, 2001) available at 2001 WL 9677785.
168. Id.; see 99 Cents Only Stores Wins Lawsuit in
California Over Property Rights, The Wall St. J., (July 2,
2001); see Martha L. Willman, The Valley Lancaster’s
Store Grab Try Illegal Ruling: City erred in plan to take 99
Cents Only property and transfer it to Costco, judge says,
L.A. Times, Valley Edition, (June 30, 2001).
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2. Welfare of the Public’s Eyes Rests in
the Hands of the Legislature
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homeowner whose house is being sought by
the city’s redevelopment agency for a
Starbucks coffee shop parking lot.169 Courts
that actively check legislative decisions will
reduce corruption and collusion between
cities and private entities. By actually
enforcing the Public Use provision, courts
will no longer rubber stamp whatever redevelopment agencies do.170 One such court,
another United States district court in the
Central District of California, relied on the
Public Use provision to prevent the transfer
of private land for redevelopment purposes.171 In this case, the city wanted to give the
private land of a church to Costco in order to
further retail development.172 The court
likened the situation to that in 99 Cents Only
and described both scenarios as “the naked
transfer of property from one private party to
another.”173 The similarities between the
cases are eerie, but the potential power of
the Public Use provision is evident.
Perhaps, the result will be a greater
emphasis on property rights, more similar
to the intent of Madison and the
framers.174 However, the courts must also
recognize the modern complexities of
society as important. Madison probably
did not envision redevelopment projects
and their impact on the modern understanding of the Taking Clause.
Eminent domain should be limited
to the creation of either pure public goods
or quasi-public goods subject to common
carrier provisions.175 One problem with cur169. Maeshiro, supra note 165.
170. Greenhut, supra note 167.
171. Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cypress
Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D.
Cal. 2002).
172. Id. at 1209.
173. Id. at 1229.
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rent analysis of the takings clause and the
public use provision is the lack of any factors for the courts to apply to redevelopment situations. One possible approach
would be a balancing test where the court
would weigh the following factors: “(1) the
amount of deference courts are to give to
the municipality’s proposed legislative
action; (2) the economic costs of the takings; (3) the economic benefits of the proposed development; and finally, (4) the private market alternatives that are available to
acquire the necessary realty.”176 This test
may be effective, but like so many other balancing tests, the lack of a clear test may lead
to inconsistent application.
The largest downfall in takings cases
is the lack of a clear definition of the public use provision. Under Berman, the court
must focus on the redevelopment agency’s
findings of blight.177 This requirement was
relaxed in Midkiff, where only purely private
takings run awry of the public use provision.178 In order to reconcile the many federal district and appellate court decisions,
the United States Supreme Court needs to
develop a comprehensive test to determine what is a public use. Whether this
test would hamper redevelopment or protect property owners, it would give guidance to the courts and to the legislative
bodies as to what conduct lies within the
government’s eminent domain power.

174.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton); “Property,” supra note 129.
175. Thomas Merrill, The Economics of Public Use,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 86 (1986).
176. See Kulick, supra note 22 at 679.
177. Berman, 348 U.S.at 35.
178. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
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Takings Resource Guide
1. Timothy Sandefur, A Natural Rights Perspective on Eminent Domain in California: A
Rationale for Meaningful Judicial Scrutiny of "Public Use," 32 Sw. U. L. Rev. 569, 676
(2003).
Examines the theoretical history of the state constitution's public use clause and its
current vitality as a limitation on the government's power to take property without
an owner's consent.
2. David L. Callies, Compulsory Purchase in Hawaii: What's a Public Purpose?, 6-JUN
Haw. B.J. 6, 33 (2002).
States the rule in Hawaii with respect to public purpose is the federal rule: absent
an inconceivable public purpose, or one without foundation or impossible, our
courts defer to the judgment of the state legislature and the county councils.
3. Robert G. Klein, Twenty First Century Condemnation: Say Aloha to "Public Purpose,"
6-JUN Haw. B.J. 7, 36 (2002).
Argues that at least for the last half century, the ascendant proposition has been that
both State legislatures and their county analogues can effectuate takings of private
property for purposes co-extensive with their "police powers."
4. Jeffery W. Scott, Public Use and Private Profit: When Should Heightened Scrutiny be
Applied to "Public-Private" Takings?, 12-SUM J. Affordable Housing & Community
Dev. L. 466 (2003).
Suggests a means to curb the abuses of public-private takings without destroying
their utility for legitimate public projects.
5. Takings and Wetlands
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/fact18.html
The EPA answers the question: When does a government action affecting private
property amount to a "taking," and what are the takings implications of wetland regulation?
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